While there have been numerous papers on the employment and wage effects of mergers and acquisitions, there has been no direct analysis of the impact of such ownership changes on minority and female workers. This is an unexplored "equity" dimension of these transactions. We fill this gap by analyzing linked employer-employee data for the entire population of Swedish workers and approximately 16,000 manufacturing plants for the period 1985-1998. For each worker employed in these establishments (as well as the entire population of workers), we have data on gender, age, national origin, level of education, type of education, location, industrial sector, annual earnings, as well as each employee's complete work history during the period. We also have data on numerous plant and firm-level characteristics, which allows us to control for additional factors that might result in changes in labor composition and relative compensation. Our findings suggest that ownership change does not significantly alter the relative earnings and employment status of minority and female workers.
I. INTRODUCTION
The recent resurgence in mergers and acquisitions has focused greater attention on assessing the impact of these transactions on workers. Some scholars have asserted that corporate takeovers have deleterious effects on workers. For example, Shleifer and Summers (1987) conjecture that the new owners of a firm in the aftermath of a hostile takeover are more likely to abrogate implicit contracts with employees, with respect to wages, benefits, and pension contributions. More specifically, they assert that shareholder wealth creation arising from corporate takeovers need not reflect improvements in economic welfare or efficiency. Instead, the increase in economic performance may reflect a transfer of wealth from employees and other non-financial stakeholders to shareholders.
More generally, we may wish to assess whether there are changes in equity, as well as efficiency, in the aftermath of a merger or acquisition. One such equity issue concerns whether these transactions have differential effects on female and minority workers. There is a vast theoretical and empirical literature on discriminatory bias in labor force practices, such as hiring and compensation. There have also been numerous empirical studies of the employment and wage effects of mergers and acquisitions at the plant and firm-levels (Brown and Medoff (1988) , Lichtenberg and Siegel (1987 , 1990a , McGuckin et al. (1998) , McGuckin and Nguyen (2001) , Conyon et al. (2002a Conyon et al. ( , 2002b Conyon et al. ( , 2004 , and Gugler and Yurtoglu (2004) ). To the best of our knowledge, these studies have not directly considered the relationship between ownership change and workforce diversity and relative compensation.
In this paper, we attempt to fill this gap by analyzing a unique file that links economic and demographic data, which allows us to assess the labor market consequences of ownership change for women and minorities. Although there have been several papers on the employment and wage effects of mergers and acquisitions, the unit of analysis in such studies is typically the plant or firm. In contrast, the unit of observation in our study is the individual worker, which allows us to provide direct, systematic empirical evidence on the effects of ownership change on various types of workers.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the following section, we briefly review empirical studies of the employment and wage effects of ownership change and describe their limitations for assessing the impact of these transactions on workforce diversity. Section III outlines our econometric framework. Section IV describes the data and the construction of key variables. Empirical results are presented in Section V, followed by preliminary conclusions in the final section of the paper.
II. BRIEF REVIEW OF PLANT AND FIRM-LEVEL STUDIES OF THE EMPLOYMENT AND WAGE EFFECTS OF OWNERSHIP CHANGE
In recent decades, there has been a substantial increase in the female labor participation rate and higher levels of educational attainment among women and minorities. In 1987, the Hudson Institute estimated that 85% of the new entrants to the labor force will be minorities and women and companies responded to this prediction.
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Specifically capitalizing on these trends and outreach programs to exacerbate them, many corporations have devoted substantial resources to enhancing and managing "diversity." Most large companies have developed an infrastructure, typically subsumed in the human resource management function, to monitor and evaluate diversity. Thus, for many firms, enhancing workforce diversity is considered to be a strategic objective.
1 See Johnston and Packer (1987) .
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Diversity professionals often assess performance based on an explicit consideration of the racial and gender composition of the workforce. One perspective on this issue involves examining whether the workforce is "representative," in terms of the racial and gender profile of the population-at-large or the local labor market. Consistent with this view, managerial decisions regarding selection, retention, and promotion have been made on the basis of diversity criteria. While many companies do not have explicit quotas or targets, there is strong pressure on corporate managers to move in this direction. For many diversity professionals, a workforce that is representative constitutes an "optimal" mix of workers.
Despite the considerable attention devoted to these issues, there is a remarkable lack of empirical evidence on the relationship between diversity and changes in corporate control.
Instead, such studies have focused on employment and wage effects for employees in general. Table 1 summarizes selected plant and firm-level studies of the impact of mergers and acquisitions on workers. Much of the plant-level evidence seems to indicate that ownership change does not result in statistically significant declines in the employment and wages of production workers at production establishments. The most comprehensive evidence, presented in McGuckin and Nguyen (2001) , suggests that wages and employment increase after ownership change. On the other hand, Lichtenberg and Siegel (1990a) find that employment and wage growth are lower in central office or "auxiliary" establishments in the aftermath of an ownership change, suggesting that white-collar workers suffer more than blue-collar employees when such transactions occur. Baldwin (1998) reported that mergers in Canada had a negative impact on employment and compensation of non-production workers. Conyon, Girma, Thompson, and Wright (2002a) report similar results, based on firm-level data from the U.K. The authors also find greater declines in employment associated with related mergers, relative to those associated with unrelated mergers. In a subsequent paper (Conyon, Girma, Thompson, and Wright (2004) ), they report that wage increases tend to follow mergers, especially related mergers. Gugler and Yurtoglu (2004) compare the employment effects of U.S. and European mergers. The authors find that there is a 10% decline in labor demand in the aftermath of mergers involving European firms. Bhagat, Shleifer, and Vishny (1990) report that 45% of the firms involved in hostile takeovers laid off workers, affecting about 6% of the workforce.
It appears that similar patterns emerge in the aftermath of leveraged and management buyouts in the U.S. and U.K. Based on data from U.S. evidence, report declines in levels of employment and wages of non-production workers at manufacturing plants that experience a buyout. These patterns do not emerge for production workers, however. Harris, Siegel, and Wright (2005) analyze British data and conclude that management buyouts result in a reduction in the labor intensity of production. Bliss and Rosen (2001) analyze the effect of bank mergers on CEO compensation. They report that these ownership changes have a positive effect on CEO remuneration. In more than 75% of the transactions they observed, the post-merger increase in CEO compensation exceeded 10% of the CEO's pre-merger remuneration.
Others have directly analyzed the effects of takeovers on the compensation of nonexecutive employees. Mitchell and Mulherin (1989) report that only a small percentage of corporate takeovers result in pension fund terminations. Similarly, Pontiff, Shleifer, and Weisbach (1990) find that only 15% of hostile takeover bids and 8% of friendly takeover bids lead to pension fund terminations. Rosett (1990) examines whether takeovers result in labor contract settlements that favor management, as opposed to workers. He reports that takeover activity is unrelated to wage growth. More importantly, Rosett concludes that, contrary to the Shleifer and Summers' 1988) hypothesis, the gains to shareholders arising from corporate takeovers do not appear to result from losses to employees.
Although these studies are useful, they do not address the question of how ownership change affects different types of workers. In the following section, we outline an econometric model that enables us to assess this issue.
III. ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS
In order to assess the impact of these transactions on "equity," as opposed to efficiency or performance, we wish to examine two worker-related dependent variables: earnings and changes in employment status. In addition to conventional determinants of these variables, we incorporate a set of dummy variables relating to ownership change, gender, and national origin, as well as conventional determinants of these factors.
The base earnings equation that we estimate is:
where α is an intercept term, EARN denotes the annual earnings of individual i working in establishment e of firm f in year t+1 or year t-1, OC t is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the plant experiences an ownership change in year t or 0 otherwise, X it is a vector of individual-specific characteristics, Y et is a vector of establishment-specific characteristics, δ and φ are vectors of coefficients, λ t is a year-specific fixed effect, and ε it is the remaining classical disturbance term. Industry dummies are included at the employee level, allowing industrial occupation to differ among workers in each plant.
We also wish the estimate the relationship between ownership change and employment status following these transactions for various types of workers. To assess this issue, we estimate a multinomial logit equation of the following form:
where EMPSTATUS refers to employment status j in year t +1 of individual i who was employed in establishment e as of year t-1, and the other variables are defined as in equation (1).
There are three possible employment statuses: a worker can be employed by the original or acquiring organization, employed by another organization, or unemployed.
IV. DATA
Our empirical analysis is based on linked, longitudinal employer-employee data on Swedish workers and plants that employ them. The file covers every non-farm employee in
Sweden in every year from 1985 to 1998. The full database contains 36,398,617 records across the 14 years of data, for an average of 2.6 million workers per year, consistent with the Swedish population of close to 9 million. Establishment level data are available for the majority of employees if and when they were employed in the manufacturing sector, so that 9,251,962
records have matching information available about the employee's plant (and usually firm)
workplace.
The database facilitates our investigation of employment status and earnings.
Employment is recorded each year in November, and given that the database covers virtually all employees, we infer that a worker whose record is missing in a given year was not employed (the phrase "in non-farm activities" is hereafter omitted) in Sweden during that year. Annual earnings are recorded from employees' official tax filings, and are divided into earnings paid by an organization versus self-employment and other earnings. Self-employment income serves as a proxy for whether the employee was self-employed, and we use the two sources of income to divide each working employee into one of three categories in each year: organizationally employed, self-employed, or both.
For individual employees, the data include the person's gender, national origin, age, geographic location, year of last educational exam, categorical variables for educational attainment and field of education, and 5-digit SIC industry classification of employment. In a previous paper (Siegel, Simons, and Lindstrom (2005) ), we used parts of this information to construct plant-level measures of workforce characteristics, such as the percentage of workers who are female, the percentage who were born in Sweden versus immigrated, the mean age of employees, mean experience as proxied by years elapsed since last year of education, and the percentage of employees with at least some college-level education. Here we use the employeespecific data in each year as controls and to check for possible differences in effects of ownership change across different types of people.
Each record contains data on gender and the national origin of the employee. National origin is based on birthplace, divided between Sweden, other Nordic countries, the remainder of Europe, and five other world regions, Asia, Africa, North America, South America, and other nations. Employees' geographic locations, available for 99.6% of records, correspond to 338 local governments. Educational attainment and broad field of educational are likewise recorded categorically, and are available for 97% of records. Attainment is categorized as 0-8 years, 9-10 years (obligatory in Sweden), 11-12 years, 13-14 years (equivalent to a normal high school education similar to U.S. grade twelve), college or university education for one to two years (including extended high school engineering programs), college or university education for three or more years but not PhD education, or PhD education. Field of education is categorized as basic (general) education; esthetics, language, and religion; pedagogy; trade, office, economic, social, and behavioral degrees; industry-relevant education including handcrafts, engineering, mathematics, physics, chemistry, and biology; transportation and communication; caring including nursing, child care, and geriatric care; farming, gardening, forestry, and fishing; general service skills including private guards and military service; or other areas of education.
The data record the year of an employee's last educational examination in 45% of records, and a proxy for employee work experience is constructed in these cases as the logarithm of the number of years (including the last educational year) since finishing education. This proxy for experience is likely to be an adequate control despite the paucity of information on educational examination year, because examination year information is mainly lacking among older employees, for whom age dummies (also included as control variables) provide a good proxy for experience. The proxy for years of work experience may be better for male employees than female employees because males are more likely to work throughout the period following the last exam year, and accordingly we also include an interaction between years of experience and gender. origin, geographic locations, educational attainment, field of education, and industry) are represented in our analyses using 0-1 dummy variables.
Although employee, plant, or firm data are missing for some observations, we do not exclude any records from the sample on the basis of missing data, to avoid any potential sample selection bias. Instead, we set the values of missing variables equal to the population mean or zero, and add dummy variables that equal one when the relevant type of data is unavailable or zero otherwise. Hence all these variables are used as controls to the full extent possible, while records with missing observations are allowed a constant shift parameter in case they differ on average from records with available information.
Following conventional international standards, the plant or establishment is defined as a physically independent unit within a firm. Firms that are involved in multiple activities at the same physical address report separate figures for each activity, which are then assigned to a separate facility. In most cases, however, firms focus on a single activity, implying that the local units are seldom split into several plants. Plants that were considered to be "non-active" and "help plants," such as sales offices (or what would be considered "auxiliary" establishments in the U.S.), were also excluded from the data.
Employment status is measured as follows. Individuals were defined to have maintained their existing employment if they were employed in t+1 at the same plant as in t-1 or if they were 
V. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
To assess the effects of ownership change on workers, we exploit the longitudinal nature of our data by analyzing employees before and after these transactions. In the top panel of Table   2 , we present descriptive statistics on employees who were employed at manufacturing plants that are destined to experience an ownership change in the following year. For comparative purposes, we have also constructed descriptive statistics on a random sample of employees who do not experience an ownership change in the following year. Descriptive statistics for this 13 random sample of workers are presented in the bottom panel of Table 2 . Corresponding statistics for employees who are observed in the year following an ownership change are presented in the top panel of Table 3 . Once again, we also report descriptive statistics for a random sample of employees who did not experience an ownership change in the preceding year in the bottom panel of Table 3 . The sample is compared with 447,411 individual-year combinations randomly selected from the population of manufacturing employees whose plants will not be sold in the following year. It appears that workers whose establishments are destined to be sold have lower mean levels of education, experience, and earnings than the random sample of manufacturing workers.
Note that these differentials hold for each national origin category (with the exception of "rest of world" for experience). Similar patterns emerge in Table 3 , which presents descriptive statistics on workers who are observed in the aftermath of an ownership change.
In the top panel of Table 4 , we present descriptive statistics on the mobility of workers whose establishments were sold in the previous year. The bottom panel of this table contains descriptive statistics for a random sample of workers whose plants did not experience an ownership change. Several stylized facts emerge. It appears that mergers and acquisitions result in a substantial increase in worker mobility. We also find that all types of workers are more likely to become unemployed when ownership change occurs, a result that is consistent with previous plant and firm-level studies reporting that mergers and acquisitions result in downsizing (Conyon, Girma, Thompson, Wright (2002a) , Siegel, Simons, and Lindstrom (2005) ).
There is substantial variation in worker outcomes across the different national origin categories. In fact, all of the minority groups exhibit substantially higher unemployment probabilities. North Americans and Asians in particular stand out as being especially likely to become unemployed (in Sweden) after a merger or acquisition. In both the ownership change sample and the random sample, it is evident that all of the Non-European groups exhibit substantially lower probabilities than Europeans (including Nordic and Swedish groups) of maintaining employment in the same plant. While the reasons for this are not clear, the effect is 5%-15%, which is substantial.
Although the descriptive patterns presented in Tables 2, 3 , and 4 are interesting, they do not include controls for the determinants of changes in earnings and worker mobility. Table 5 presents parameter estimates from regressions of the earnings equation. The OLS estimates of the earning equations are based on the specification outlined in equation (1). In Column (1), we constrain the effects of ownership change to be the same for all workers. In Column (2) we relax that restriction, allowing the effects of ownership change to differ for females and non-Swedes.
Note that, as expected from human capital theory, the coefficients on lagged earnings and a set of dummy variables for post-secondary education (not shown on the table) are all positive and highly statistically significant. Contrary to expectations, the coefficient on experience is negative and significant. We also find that on average, women earn 19.3% less than men, controlling for the above variables plus location, industry, age, education, and experience.
Foreign-born employees also appear to earn significantly lower wages than their Swedish counterparts, especially Asian and South American workers.
We now focus our attention on the coefficients on the ownership change dummy variables and the interaction terms with the gender and national origin variables, shown in column (2). Consistent with previous plant-level studies (e.g., Siegel, Simons, and Lindstrom (2005)), we find that ownership change is associated with a reduction in earnings. On average, there appears to be a 1.5% (1.3% including the interaction terms) decline in earnings growth (relative to employees whose plant did not experience ownership change) between the year prior to the change and the year after the change.
However, it is interesting to note that almost all of the interaction terms involving ownership change, gender, and national origin are statistically insignificant. The exception is the interaction term involving workers who were born in other European countries. Thus, although women and minorities have lower earnings growth than male Swedish employees (controlling for age, education, and experience), mergers and acquisitions do not appear to exacerbate this inequality.
Next, we turn to a different dependent variable: employments the probability of unemployment. These multinomial logit regression findings are presented in Table 6 . Recall that there are three possible employment statuses: a worker can be employed by the original or acquiring organization, employed by another organization, or unemployed. In the multinomial logit regressions, the base case is being employed by the same firm or by the new owner. Once again, we estimate variants of the model: In Columns (1) and (2), the effects of ownership change are constrained be the same for all workers, while in Columns (3) and (4), the effects of ownership change are allowed to differ for females and non-Swedes.
The results imply that the probability of moving to another firm or becoming unemployed declines with higher earnings and experience. It also appears that women are less likely, ceteris paribus, to leave the organization or being unemployed. Most importantly, we find that mergers and acquisitions significantly increase the likelihood of inter-firm mobility and unemployment.
Note that the interaction terms between the ownership change, gender, and minority variables are almost all not positive and significant (with the exception of the interactions between the ownership change dummy variables and the dummies for European origin for switching to another firm and North American origin for unemployment). Indeed, the findings strongly suggest that ownership change reduces the likelihood that female workers will be transferred to another firm or fired (both interaction terms are negative and highly significant). In general, the results imply that women and minority do not experience a greater incidence of unemployment or firm transfer due to ownership change.
VI. PRELIMINARY CONCLUSIONS
Although there have been numerous papers on the employment and wage effects of mergers and acquisitions, there has been no direct analysis of the impact of such ownership changes on minority and female workers. This is an unexplored "equity" dimension of these transactions. Shleifer and Summers (1987) assert that in order to accurately assess the welfare implications of changes in corporate ownership, researchers must also assess equity effects.
Given data constraints, this has been a difficult, if not impossible, assignment. Notes: N=719,847. Controls include worker education, age, plant age, location, and industry dummies. All independent variables are observed at t-1, except that ownership change is observed at t. †p<.10, *p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001, two-tailed significance levels using heteroskedasticity robust standard errors. Notes: N=804,535. Controls include worker education, age, plant age, location, and industry dummies. All independent variables are observed at t-1, except that ownership change is observed at t. †p<.10, p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001, two-tailed significance levels using heteroskedasticity robust standard errors.
